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The following chapter is taken from Francesca Aran Murphy (ed.) The Oxford Handbook 
of Christology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 250-66. 
 
Late Medieval Atonement Theologies 
 
Rik Van Nieuwenhove, 
Durham University, UK 
 
In this paper I will attempt to outline late-medieval theologies of salvation, from 
Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. While a 
discussion of only a handful of authors may appear a modest enough enterprise, given 
the richness of late-medieval theology, it will nonetheless allow us to detect some 
important shifts, which will come to fruition in the theology of major Protestant 
thinkers.  
Peter Lombard discusses the salvific value of Christ’s life and death in Book III, 
distinctions 15-22 of his Sentences. Other distinctions, such as those dealing with the 
theological virtues (dist. 23-32), the cardinal virtues (dist. 33) and the gifts of the Holy 
Spirit (dist. 34) are also of some significance. An in-depth discussion of medieval 
theories of salvation should therefore examine more than what authors write about the 
Cross of Christ. Indeed, as we will see, scholastic theologians of the thirteenth century 
operated with an integrative vision of salvation. This means a number of things. First, to 
recall a popular distinction (Fiddes 2007) it implies that those thirteenth century 
theories of salvation are generally both objective and subjective, which means that they 
discuss the repercussions of salvation for the relation between creation and God – this 
is the objective aspect; and they also deal with the transformative effect on the Christian 
believer through the operation of grace – this is the subjective aspect. It further means 
that the saving meaning of the life, death and resurrection of the Word can only be 
theologically understood in its entirety from the perspective of intra-Trinitarian 
dynamics, which, in turn, moulds their theology of creation and their views on 
sacramental economy.  I will further suggest that this kind of integrative vision is 
usually undergirded by a Christian-Neoplatonist worldview, and when this crumbles, 
the integrative vision becomes weakened or dissipates altogether.  While this occurs in 
some Nominalist authors something of the older vision lingers on in some late-medieval 
mystical authors. By way of example I will briefly examine Ruusbroec’s contribution. 
 
Part I. Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas 
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St Bonaventure’s Christology offers an outstanding example of the kind of integr ative 
view I have alluded to. The mediating role the Son assumes between humanity and God 
finds its origin in the fact that he is the middle Person within the Trinity (generated by 
the Father, he co-spirates the Holy Spirit) (Brevil. IV, 2.6). But this centrality extends 
even further than that. In Collationes in Hexaemeron I,11,  quoting Col. 2:3 (‘Christ, in 
whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge ’) Bonaventure claims that 
the Son of God, as the central Person of the Trinity (I Sent. d.2, a.u., q.4; Hayes 2000:192-
214), is also the centre of our metaphysical, ethical, and theological worlds, amongst 
others. In metaphysical terms Bonaventure’s exemplarist worldview centres around the 
Word, in whom the Father expresses himself within the Trinity and, in doing so, 
provides the metaphysical foundation of the created world, which is the material 
expression of the archetypal exemplars which reside in the Second Person of the Trinity  
(I Sent. d. 6, a.u. q.3). Thus, like Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure considers the creation of 
the world as the material expression of the generation of the Word from the Father; and 
the intelligibility of the world, as well as its sacramentality, are founded on the divine 
exemplars which dwell in the Word. In the words of Zachary Hayes (2000a: 46):  
 
Exemplarity has a critical role to play in Bonaventure’s thought both at the 
philosophical and at the theological levels. It is only exemplarity that can unlock 
the deepest meaning of created reality to the human mind, for it is only when we 
perceive the world in its symbolic nature as the objectification of the self -
knowledge of God that we know it in its true reality. 
 
This is, incidentally, why St Bonaventure prefers the name ‘Word’ to ‘Son’, for the name 
‘Word’ implies a reference, not just to the Father, but also to creation, the Incarnation, 
and Christ’s teaching. This is well expressed in his Commentary on John, I,6: ‘And since 
the Son of God had to be described (…) not only in relationship  to the Father, from 
whom he proceeds, but also to creatures, which he made, and to the flesh which he took 
on, and to the teaching that he communicated, he had to be described in a most 
excellent and fitting manner with the term Word. For that term relates to all these 
matters.’  
 
Christ is also the foundation of morality. In terms stronger than those of Thomas 
Aquinas (ST II-II, q.23, a.7; ST II-II, q.10, a.4), Bonaventure will argue that genuine virtue 
is impossible without charity and faith in Christ. Finally, Christ is obviously at the heart 
of our theological endeavours, which focus primarily on the work of reconciliation 
(opera reconciliationis). The Incarnation and Cross of Christ are the central source of 
grace, which branches out in the theological and cardinal virtues, the gifts and fruits of 
the Holy Spirit, the habit of the beatitudes (Brevil. V) and the sacramental economy 
(Brevil. VI).  
Within the confines of this contribution I cannot develop all aspects of Bonaventure’s 
rich and multi-faceted Christology (such as its Trinitarian foundation; its implications 
for his exemplarist  understanding of creation, for the nature of philosophy, and for the 
role Christ plays in our illumination, both epistemologically and in terms of grace) . 
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Instead I will focus on his soteriology in the strictest sense, namely his views on the 
salvific meaning of the death of Christ. As a preliminary remark, however, I need to 
point out that in Bonaventure’s view, however, the Incarnation perfects creation, 
‘bringing the entire universe to full perfection by uniting the first and the last, the Word 
of God, which is the origin of all things, and human nature, which was the last of all 
creatures.’ (Brevil. IV, 1.2) It can therefore not be understood solely in terms of 
reparation of sin.  John Duns Scotus was to further develop this idea.  
Bonaventure adopts the Anselmic theory of satisfaction but supplements it in a number 
of ways (as did Thomas Aquinas).  He will, for instance, pay more attention to the 
question how exactly Christ is the fountainhead of grace and merit for humankind. 
Although Anselm’s argument hinges on the sinlessness of Christ (as the holy 
representative of humanity) he did not sufficiently probe the question how Christ’s 
headship was a source of grace, nor did he ponder the significance of the organic link 
between Christ and his members, the Church. Both Bonaventure and Thomas were to 
correct this. As has become clear from the chapter by David Hogg, Anselm’s theory of 
satisfaction should not be interpreted in terms of a vindictive God who needs 
retribution of the Cross to appease his divine anger. Rather, sin distorts the created 
world and the sacrifice or self-gift of the God-man repairs the brokenness of creation, 
and restores its glory. In short, Anselm’s notion  of satisfaction is not indebted to the 
world of feudalism (as is so often claimed) but it is rather similar to the sacrament of 
penance, in which the sinful person expresses his sorrow by making a sacrifice, which 
thus becomes satisfactory (i.e., it restores the relationship with God from whom we had 
alienated ourselves) (Van Nieuwenhove, 2003).  
When discussing the traditional view that the Incarnation occurred to redeem 
humankind Bonaventure adopts the Anselmic language of satisfaction:  
Humanity could not recover its excellence through any other redeemer than God. 
For if this redeemer had been a mere creature, then humanity would have 
become subject to another creature, and thus would not have regained its state 
of excellence. Nor could humanity have recovered its state of friendship with God 
(amicitiam  quoque Dei recuperare non poterat) except by means of a suitable 
mediator, who could touch God with one hand and humanity with the other, who 
could be the likeness and friend of both: God-like in his divinity, and like us in his 
humanity. Nor, again, could humankind have recovered purity of soul (innocentia 
mentis) if its guilt had not been removed, which divine justice could not fittingly 
remit unless suitable satisfaction had been made (per satisfactionem condignam). 
But only God could make such satisfaction for the whole human race, while 
humanity alone was bound to make it because it had sinned. Therefore it was 
most appropriate (congruentissimum) that humanity should be restored by a 
God-man, born of Adam’s stock. (Brevil. IV, 1.4; cf. also III Sent. d.20 a.u. q.2) 
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A number of points are worth noting. Firstly, Bonaventure argues that salvation through 
the Incarnation, life, death and resurrection of Christ was the most fitting manner of 
redeeming humankind. He does not claim that it is the only possible way – but it has, if I 
can put it that way, a certain aesthetic appeal. Secondly, while satisfactio is intrinsically 
linked with Christ’s suffering (III Sent. d. 16.1 q.1) the source of merit of Christ’s atoning 
work is not suffering itself but rather his love and obedience which finds expression in 
that suffering (III Sent. d.18 a.1q.3). Thirdly, as he explains in III Sent. d.20 a.u. q.2 
(inspired by St Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo, II.20) satisfactio is deeply alien to a vindictive 
understanding of God, for the key presupposition of satifactio is the fact that it 
harmonises divine mercy and justice. A restoration of our relationship with God without 
satisfactio, by mere divine fiat, would not be in accord with justice (for it would be a 
whitewash of sin, unacceptable in light of the profundity of evil committed by 
humankind); again, if God demanded retribution without the atoning activity of the 
God-man, he would be lacking in mercy. Fourthly, it is important to note what 
‘satisfaction’ effects: it is the cause of our purification from sin, allowing us to regain our 
‘innocence’. Thus, the satisfaction Christ offers changes our relationship with God, 
allowing us to recover our state of friendship with God; it does not change God; it 
changes us – a perspective that Anselm had shared, following St Augustine’s Book X of 
De Civitate Dei.  Thus, through the self-gift of God in Christ we who were guilty before 
God become righteous, and our miserable condition becomes transformed into a 
glorious one. This transformation of humankind is an on-going process, which implies 
our participation in the life of the Church and its sacraments, which are filled with the 
merit of Christ’s Passion (III Sent. d.20 a.u. q.4) – the topic of the Fourth Book of the 
Sentences. 
When arguing that no other sinless creature (creatura pura) could make satisfaction or 
atone, Bonaventure (again following Anselm) claims that the offense of God – given his 
infinite dignity – is so large that even a sinless creature that is not divine could not 
possibly make recompense (III Sent. d.20 a.u. q.3).  As we will see, Duns Scotus was to 
question the notion that Christ’s merit has an infinite value on account of his divine 
Personhood. He will also dispute whether the Word-incarnate was necessary for our 
salvation. Before we deal with Duns Scotus’s views we will examine the soteriology of St 
Thomas Aquinas. 
*** 
Thomas Aquinas’s Christology is to be found mainly in the Third Part of his Summa 
Theologiae. Again it would be a mistake to neglect to mention that he, like Bonaventure, 
operates with an integrative vision, which situates soteriological issues in a broader 
Trinitarian perspective, and connects them with sacramentology, ecclesiology, and the 
life of Christian virtues.  Like Bonaventure, Thomas draws an explicit connection, for 
instance, between the generation of the Word from the Father within the Trinity, and 
the acts of creation and salvation. In relation to creation: in generating the Son the 
Father expresses himself and the whole of creation (ST I, q.34, a.3).  Every created thing, 
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therefore, has traces of the Trinity written in the core of its being. The Word is reflected 
in the very form inherent in a created thing, ‘as the form of the thing made by art is from 
the conception of the craftsman (ex conceptione artificis)’ (ST I, q.45, a.7) – a perspective 
deeply indebted to Augustine’s Christian Neoplatonism. Or again, there is both a visible 
sending of the Son (Incarnation), and an invisible sending in the soul resulting in ‘a 
certain experimental knowledge’ or loving wisdom (ST I, q.43, a.5 ad 2). These missions 
are the temporal ‘extensions’, if you like, of the eternal generation of the Son from the 
Father. We acquire this loving wisdom by becoming incorporated in Christ through 
grace and charity, becoming adoptive sons. Thus we are likened to the Eternal Word, 
reflecting, and participating in, the oneness between the Father and his Son (ST III, q.23, 
a.3). 
Scholars (Torrell:1999) have noted that Thomas pays more attention than his 
predecessors to the life of Christ (ST III, q.35-45), before considering his death, 
resurrection, and ascension into heaven. When discussing the saving meaning of 
Christ’s death, Thomas adopts the notion of satisfaction from Anselm, and he shares his 
view that the infinity of sin required a God-man, whose divine Personhood bestowed an 
infinite dignity upon his saving work (ST III, q.1, a.2 ad 2) – a view Duns Scotus was to 
challenge. I wrote “required” because Thomas holds the view that, strictly speaking, God 
could have saved humanity in a different way, without the Incarnation of his Son (ST III, 
q.1, a.2). Again, in relation to the question whether God would have become human if 
sin had not occurred, he appears to have a preference for the view that God would have 
become incarnate anyhow, although he acknowledges that the Biblical witness favours 
the other view (ST III, q.1, a.3). 
With Anselm and Bonaventure, Thomas argues that satisfactio harmonises God’s mercy 
and justice (ST III, q.46, a.1, ad 3), and he draws a distinction (ST I-II, q.87, a.7) between 
punishment in the strict sense (which is inflicted upon us against our will), on the one 
hand, and making satisfaction on the other. We freely undertake the latter to restore our 
relationship with God, through Christ, as in acts of penance. This distinction also applies 
to the Cross of Christ (which must be understood in terms of penance by the sinless 
representative of humanity, rather than in terms of punishment by an angry God).  Thus, 
given this link between penance and making satisfaction, Thomas’s soteriology cannot 
be possibly understood in penal terms, or meeting the demands of vindictive justice but 
should be seen in terms of ‘the reconciliation of friendship’ (reconciliatio amicitiae) (ST 
III, q.90, a.2).  
Thomas makes some interesting additions. First, he makes clearer than Anselm had 
done, that one person can make satisfaction for another if they are united in charity  (ST 
I-II, q.87, a.8). This explains why Thomas emphasises the organic unity between Christ 
and the members of his Body: ‘The Head and members are as one mystic person; and 
therefore Christ’s satisfaction belongs to all the faithful as being his members. ’ (ST III, 
q.48, a.2 ad 1) – a theological view which is closely linked with his more developed 
notion as to how Christ can be the source of grace as the Head of the Church (ST III, q.8): 
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‘grace was bestowed upon Christ, not only as an individual, but inasmuch as he is the 
Head of the Church, so that it might overflow into his members .’ (ST III, q.48, a.1) This 
intimate link between Christ and his Church, the community of believers, further 
suggests that Thomas does not subscribe to a theory of substitution but sees salvation 
in terms of participation (we participate in, and appropriate, the salvation Christ 
effected).  
While retaining the notion of satisfaction in the key-question on the efficiency of Christ’s 
passion (ST III, q.48), Thomas introduces a number of other central terms, such as merit 
(ST III, q.48, a.1) and redemption (ST III, q.48, a.4), the “buying back” from our servitude 
to sin – although it must be said that Thomas reverts back to language of satisfactio to 
describe redemptio throughout the article. Another key term, of major significance, is 
sacrifice, which has the advantage of being more explicitly Biblical than satisfactio, and 
which allows Thomas to develop a rich theology of how the Old Testament ceremonies 
prefigured the sacrifice of Christ (ST, I-II, q.102). Let’s discuss this notion of sacrifice  in 
some more detail, as it will allow us to recapitulate a number of issues. First, sacrifices 
are offered to God, not for his benefit, but for that of ourselves and our neighbour ( ST II-
II, q.30, a.4 ad 1) – which again illustrates that Thomas does not subscribe to a theory of 
divine propitiation or appeasement (ST III, q.49, a.4 ad 2). Secondly, Thomas states that 
every external sacrifice derives its value from an inner or invisible sacrifice.  Drawing on 
Book X of De Civitate Dei, he repeatedly quotes (ST III, q.22, a.2; ST III, q.48, a.3 obj. 3) 
Augustine’s dictum that ‘a visible sacrifice is a sacrament – that is, a sacred sign – of an 
invisible sacrifice.’ An outward or visible sacrifice can be any action performed for God’s 
sake; but this outward action is only an expression of an inner sacrifice, which is our gift 
of self to God in devotion and love (cf. ST II-II, q.85, a.4).  Thus, the ‘invisible sacrifice’ 
which finds expression in visible sacrifices we perform, is our sanctification, whereby 
we offer ourselves up to God (ST III, q.22, a.2; ST II-II, q.85, a.2, quoting Ps. 51:19; ST II-
II, q.85, a.4 and ST III, q.48, a.3 ad 2).  This view of sacrifice has a number of 
implications.  
Firstly, it entails that the sufferings of Christ are not the primary source of our salvation, 
but rather what they denote (‘invisibly’), namely his love and obedience to the Father 
(ST III, q.47, a.4 ad 2; ST III, q.47, a.2 ad 3).  While later medieval piety relished suffering 
and the power of the blood (Walker Bynum 2004), this is not Thomas’s primary 
concern.  
Secondly, it establishes an intimate link between Christ’s self-gift in his life and death, 
and the self-gift of the Christian believer throughout his life. For every deed performed 
for the sake of God acquires a ‘sacrificial’ dimension, uniting us to God and Christ (ST II-
II, q.85, a.3 ad 1).  This brings us to an important aspect of Thomas’s soteriology, namely 
the way he emphasises how we need to appropriate Christ’s saving work, by becoming 
members of his Body, the Church, in faith, hope, and love and participation in the 
sacraments (ST III, q.49, a.3 ad 1). For the fact that Christ is the Head of the Church cuts 
both ways: it means that Christ’s merits can be shared with us; but it also means that we 
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are called to become Christ-like through sharing in his sacrificial life. Indeed, Thomas, 
when acknowledging that afflictions and death still remain although Christ has 
redeemed us, states that this is as it should be, for our afflictions in this life allow us to 
become conformed to Christ’s sufferings (ST, I-II, q.85, a.5 ad 2), allowing us to bear the 
marks of Christ’s passion in us (Van Nieuwenhove, 2005:291). Commenting on Rom. 
8:17 he writes that we can only partake in Christ’s glory through sharing in suffering, 
allowing us to grow in likeness to Christ (Ad Rom. no. 651; ST III, q.49, a.3 ad 3; ST I-II, 
q.85, a.5 ad 2). The least one can say is that Thomas’s understanding of salvation does 
not fail to face up to the realities of life’s afflictions. 
Thirdly, the link Augustine established between ‘sacrifice’ and ‘sacrament’ proves very 
fruitful too. Sacrifice, so Thomas informs us, is etymologically derived from the notion of 
making holy (facit sacrum –cf. ST II-II, q.85, a.3 ad 3). It is therefore no surprise that 
Thomas, when beginning to explain the nature of sacraments in general, again quotes 
Augustine’s saying that the visible sacrifice is the sacred sign, or sacrament, of an 
invisible sacrifice (in the Sed Contra of ST III, q.60, a.1).  A sacrament is defined in 
general terms as a sign of something holy which sanctifies us (signum rei sacrae 
inquantum est sanctificans homines - ST III, q.60, a.2), or, in popular scholastic parlance, 
it effects what it signifies (efficiunt quod figurant: ST III, q.62, a.1 ad 1) – and what it 
effects is our sanctification, which is exactly what constituted the nature of the invisible 
sacrifice in Augustine’s dictum. The ‘something holy’ a sacrament refers to is ultimately 
Christ’s saving work.  Indeed, because Christ’s humanity is the instrument of his divinity 
– a notion Thomas borrowed from John Damascene – all aspects of Christ’s life and 
death acquire a saving significance (ST III, q.48, a.6).  The intimate link between sacrifice 
and sacrament can be further clarified by mentioning Thomas’s insight – inspired by St 
Paul – that Christ’s passion is the sacrament of our salvation, for through Christ’s death 
and resurrection we die to sin and attain new life in and for God (Ad Rom.  6:11, no. 491; 
ST III, q.56, a.2 ad 4).  
The sacraments in the strict sense (baptism, Eucharist…) are specific signs and 
instrumental causes of the continuing efficacy of Christ’s salvific work. As suggested, 
they derive their saving power from Christ’s passion, as was symbolised by the water 
and blood flowing from the side of the crucified Christ (ST III, q.62, a.5). Baptism, ‘the 
door of the sacraments’ (ST III, q.73, a.3), for instance, makes us conformable to Christ’s 
passion and resurrection, insofar as we die to sin and begin a new life of righteousness 
(ST III, q.66, a.2). This illustrates, again, that Thomas sees our justification in intrinsicist 
terms: it is not a mere imputation of justice but requires an inner transformation, 
caused by Christ’s passion (in the past), effected (in the present) in us through grace 
and virtues, and pointing towards our future participation in eternal life with God (ST 
III, q.60, a.3). Similarly, in an article in which Thomas discusses the different names of  
the Eucharist (ST III, q.73, a.4), he points out that it recalls the sacrifice of Christ’s 
passion (past), establishes unity or communion amongst the faithful (present), and 
anticipates our future enjoyment of God, sharing in the good grace (Eucharist) of life 
ever-lasting (cf. Rom. 6:23).  
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Thomas’s soteriology is a very rich one indeed. It is a vision spanning the whole 
spectrum of his theology – from its origins in the heart of the Trinity to his 
sacramentology and eschatology.  It permeates every aspect of his theology and 
spirituality. Shunning all extrinsicism, for him salvation is a call to participation and 
transformation in Christ, which explains why Thomas’s discussions of different virtues 
in the Second Part of the Summa Theologiae are often crowned by a reference to the 
beatitudes (ST I-II, q.69) and gifts of the Holy Spirit (ST I-II, q.68), indicating that the 
Christian life of virtue needs to be understood from within Christological and 
pneumatological perspectives (Pinckaers 1995: 154-155). Given the centrality of his 
notion of the Church as the Mystical Body of Christ, implying an intimate link between 
Christ and the faithful, I am reluctant to call his soteriology a “theory” of salvation but 
rather an invitation to live and die in Christ. 
While Thomas’s soteriology is not legalistic, forensic , penal or substitutionary, some 
modern scholars might still object to the fact that Thomas refuses to attribute suffering 
to the divine nature (ST III, q.46, a.12) – unlike many twentieth century theologians who 
argue that a God who is immune to suffering cannot love either (Moltmann 1974:219-
227). Thomas, deeply imbued with a sense of the otherness and transcendence of God, 
argues that the Word suffers, not in his divine nature, as God, but in his human nature, 
as man. While this theological position may not satisfy modern theologians it seems to 
me a sound one. As Thomas Weinandy (2000:206) made clear, the view that God suffers 
as God – whatever that could possibly mean – does not do justice to the radical nature of 
the Christian claim of what the Incarnation is about. What matters is not that God 
suffers as God, but that the Word suffers as a human being:  
This is what humankind is crying out to hear, not that God experiences, in a 
divine manner, our anguish and suffering in the midst of a sinful and depraved 
world, but that he actually experienced and knew first hand, as one of us – as a 
man – human anguish and suffering within a sinful and depraved world. This is 
what a proper understanding of the Incarnation requires and affirms. (Weinandy 
2000:206) 
 
Part II. Duns Scotus and William of Ockham 
 
Duns Scotus wrote after the Condemnations of 1277, which led to an increasing 
separation of faith and theology, on the one hand, and reason and philosophy, on the 
other, which in turn resulted in a growing voluntarist understanding of God, rather than 
the other way around. (Van Nieuwenhove, 2013) This voluntarism was to have 
important ramifications for both his own and later scholastic soteriology, such as 
Ockham’s. 
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Duns Scotus is mainly remembered for his defence of the immaculate conception of the 
Virgin Mary – a doctrine which had been rejected by the major thirteenth century 
scholastics as it appeared to undermine the universality of Christ’s salvific activity, 
which is why they argued that Mary’s sanctification occurred in utero sometime after 
her conception. Duns Scotus also explicitly argued that the Incarnation and the 
predestination of Jesus would have taken place, even if sin had not occurred (Lect. Par. 
III, 19,7) – thus radicalising the views on this issue of his predecessors.  
Duns Scotus is in some ways an innovator, and in other ways a transitional figure: while 
he retains a realist outlook (as distinct from Ockham’s later nominalism) he does 
introduce a moderate voluntarism in theology. This voluntarism is aimed at 
safeguarding God’s utter freedom and transcendence: ‘no other good, apart from God 
himself, functions as a reason for God’s willing’  (Rep. Par. I-A, d.41 sol. q., no. 55), and if 
something is right or good it is such ‘not simply on account of right reason, but insofar 
as it is willed by God’ (Rep. Par. I-A, d.44 q.2 no.31).  This perspective has important 
implications for soteriology. Duns Scotus adopts the theory of satisfaction (Lect. Par. III, 
20; Ord. III, d.20 un., n.3  & 10; Ord. IV, d.15, q.1) but he differs from Anselm on a 
number of issues. First, Duns Scotus denies that the offense caused by Adam’s sin is 
intrinsically infinite – which was a key presupposition of Anselm and his followers.  He 
further denies (Lect. III, d.20, q.1, no. 39) that satisfaction for sin could only have 
occurred through a God-man (again aiming to safeguard God’s utter freedom). In 
contrast to his predecessors Duns Scotus is of the view that a pure creature could have 
made satisfaction for humanity. This does not take anything away from the glory of God, 
on the contrary. As Andrew Rosato puts it (Rosato 2009:175): ‘Knowing that God 
became incarnate and died on the Cross, when something other or lesser would have 
been able to merit grace for the fallen, should enkindle a deep love for God in man 
because it reveals the lengths to which God will go to bring his fallen creatures back to 
him.’ 
Scotus pays particular attention to the questions how Christ’s atonement is the source 
of merit.  Christ’s saving work is only considered meritorious because God deems it such 
(Ord. III, d. 19, q. un., no. 7).  This does not mean that, for Duns Scotus, divine acceptatio 
is utterly arbitrary.  The divine acceptance of Christ’s merit is based, not on his divine 
Personhood  (a theological position which Scotus considers problematic, if only because 
it downplays the role of Christ’s human will) but it is grounded on the created will and 
created grace of the God-man (Rosato 2009:165ff).  Andrew S. Yang has made clear 
acceptatio is a ‘broad theological term’ that does not simply refer to the fact that God 
passively accepts our good acts performed at the stirring of the infused habit of charity. 
It can also refer, in a more active sense, to the divine ordination to accept such acts as 
meritorious in accordance with his eternal will, which provides the ontological basis for 
the passive acceptance. Duns Scotus’s notion of divine acceptatio thus aims to 
underscore that ultimately the divine will, rather than secondary causes, is the cause of 
merit:  
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[It] means that there is a higher cause of God’s passive acceptance of X than the 
fact that X is of such meritorious worth, and that this cause is none other than the 
acceptatio by which God has preordained X as an act meritorious of a certain 
reward and has promised to passively accept it in the future as such. Therefore, 
Scotus’ voluntarism is not as extreme as some scholars allege. (Yang 2009: 432 -
33).   
Scotus’ moderate voluntarism further extends to his understanding of sin (where he 
adopts a forensic notion) and his view on sacraments (here he refuses to attribute 
instrumental causality), and ethics (his rejection of eudaimonistic ethics). (Van 
Nieuwenhove 2013:240).  Thus, while Scotus’s voluntarism is not as radical as is often 
alleged, the integrative dimension begins nonetheless to crumble in his theological 
outlook. The emphasis shifts to questions of merit and divine acceptance, while the 
intrinsic connections between theology of the Trinity, soteriology, and sacramentology 
are beginning to wane. It is, however, in the theology of William of Ockham that we find 
a more radical exponent of this approach. 
*** 
William of Ockham is best remembered for his nominalist position, namely, the 
philosophical view that universals are nothing but names, and every mind-independent 
thing is particular. Universality is a feature of our cognitive acts and does not refer to 
anything outside the mind. This nominalist position is a clear departure from the realist 
stance of Duns Scotus and his thirteenth century predecessors (Bonave nture, Thomas 
Aquinas).  William, however, further radicalises Duns Scotus’s voluntarism and his 
aversion of Neoplatonism. Like Duns Scotus, Ockham operates with a strong 
understanding of divine freedom and omnipotence. This also implies a rejection of 
divine ideas.  
It is here, perhaps, that William’s main contribution lies (rather than in his nominalism 
as such): if the world consists solely of individual items, and universals have no real 
ontological status, the Christian Neoplatonic world loses its rational foundation. There 
are no longer any divine ideas (for they were, of course, universals), or rather: divine 
ideas operate no longer as exemplars of created beings but are nothing but the 
immediate knowledge God has of creatures themselves.  This rules traditional 
exemplarism out, and with its demise the world loses its intrinsic ontological 
intelligibility, which explains why Ockham is often portrayed as a philosopher who 
prepares the way for both a more empiricist or experiential approach, and a more 
fideist one. Moreover, as I argued elsewhere (Van Nieuwenhove 2013:256-263), the 
rejection of divine ideas implies the demise of the medieval sacramental worldview in 
which creation is a pointer towards God, and makes him present. Accordingly, it will 
also do away with the transcendental thrust of medieval theology, opening the way for a 
more diesseitig approach to the world.  
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We have only a fragmentary Reportatio of his comments on Book III of the Sentences, 
consisting of only 12 questions. Of these only questions 8 (on grace in the soul of Christ) 
and 10 (on the Incarnation) have a general Christological rather than soteriological 
relevance in the strict sense. The reader will search in vain for an extended discussion of 
Anselm’s theory of salvation in any of Ockham’s writings. This is not surprising: if the 
distinction between divine mercy and justice is a mere conceptual one, Anselm’s 
concern to harmonise them must look rather futile. (McGrath 1985: 189) 
While he shares voluntarism with Duns Scotus, Ockham’s version of voluntarism is 
fairly radical: ‘if God wants it, by that very fact it is just’ (IV Sent. q.10-11). This has 
implications for his theory of salvation. For instance, Ockham will argue that ‘a human 
being is able by the absolute power of God to be saved without created charity ’ (Quodlib. 
VI, q.1 a.2). Clearly, Ockham radicalises Duns Scotus’s divine acceptatio theory. Only God 
decides the worth of a person or an action, and nothing is meritorious save by God’s 
acceptance. On the other hand, the point should not be over-emphasised: after all, 
Ockham is happy enough to state (ibid.) that ‘according to the laws now ordained by 
God, no human being will ever be saved (…) without created grace.’ Thus, the contrast 
between ordained and absolute power aims to stress the radical contingency of 
everything that is not God, and that the world as we know is not necessary. Su ch a view 
does not necessarily imply the concept of an arbitrary God. Indeed, rather than 
construing it in terms of an arbitrary God, the distinction between God’s potentia 
absoluta and potentia ordinata marks ‘the voluntary self-limitation of the omnipotent 
God and hence the non-necessary contingent nature of the established order of creation 
and redemption.’ (Oberman1987:460) 
What is more worrying than voluntarism as such, I think, is the fact that the world has 
lost its inner intelligibility (the rejection of divine ideas embedded in creation) and its 
sacramental character, resulting in a loss of the transcendental thrust of medieval 
scholastic thought in the fourteenth century and, in general terms, the espousal of a 
more extrinsicist understanding of the world.  Henceforth, ‘a purely natural’ 
understanding of the world develops, and the integrative vision that permeated 
scholastic theology in the thirteenth century dissolves. Thus, Ockham operates not only 
with a strong acceptation-theory, but also with an extrinsicist and forensic 
understanding of grace and sin (Aers 2009: 31). Mortal sin, for instance, cannot be 
defined in real terms but only in nominal terms: it is that which is forbidden by God, or 
that which we omit to do although it has been ordered by God (IV Sent. q. 10-11).  Again, 
salvation depends solely on divine acceptance, and downplays the role of infused habits 
or the virtue of charity. In the words of one scholar, sympathetically disposed towards 
Ockham’s outlook:  
Ockham’s point is that nothing in the natural world dictates the order of 
salvation. Beatific vision and damnation do not depend on the intrinsic nature of 
things but solely on the will of God. Hence the rules of salvation are an external 
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order not unlike the legal systems of human rulers, who regulate rewards and 
punishments by statute.’ (Wood 1997: 268-269)  
Given his individualism Ockham further fails to develop the notion of the Church as the 
Body of Christ; and the connection effected by charity between the virtues becomes 
weakened. 
It is not difficult to see Ockham as a precursor of Protestant theology which will 
consider sin and salvation mainly in forensic terms. Medieval theologians, in contrast, 
had considered sin as a distortion of created reality. Through their critique of the divine 
ideas and rejection of exemplarism – a move that was inspired by their espousal of a 
voluntarist God whose power and freedom could not possibly be limited by a rationality 
outside of himself – Ockham and his followers inaugurated a world which has lost its 
transcendental intelligibility. Sin, too, comes to be understood mainly in terms of an 
offence against God (i.e., a forensic notion) which can be dealt with through an 
extrinsicist justification. Similarly, the merit of Christ, also, is imputed by God (divine 
acceptatio) – an idea John Calvin was to adopt in his Institutes of Christian Religion II, 
17.1-5. 
 
Part III. Jan van Ruusbroec 
 
The more integrated vision of salvation was, however, not to disappear altogether. 
Indeed, it continued to find expression in the writings of some of the fourteenth century 
mystical theologians. As Denys Turner will discuss this topic in the following chapter, a 
number of brief references to one mystical theologian, Jan van Ruusbroec, will have to 
suffice.  
While Ruusbroec appears to adopt the Anselmic theory of salvation his main 
contribution lies elsewhere. He is more interested in describing our transformation 
through the modelling of our life on that of Christ, enabling us to participate in the intra -
Trinitarian dynamics. In his first book, The Realm of Lovers, Christocentric and 
Trinitarian emphases are further enriched by weaving the gifts of the Holy Spirit and 
angelic hierarchies into a complex picture that forms the backdrop for an outline of our 
transformation. I will first deal with the Trinitarian aspect; then I will consider the role 
of the Word Incarnate, and finally I will mention, by way of example, how one of gifts of 
the Holy Spirit is integrated into Ruusbroec’s outline of our transformation.   
For Ruusbroec, the acme of the Christian life is the ‘common life’ (ghemeyne leven), 
perhaps best translated as the Catholic or universal life. In order to understand its 
meaning, I need first to sketch his theology of the Trinity.  
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Ruusbroec adopts the Bonaventurean doctrine, according to which the Father generates 
his Word from the fruitfulness of his paternal nature, and from the mutual 
contemplation of Father and Son the Holy Spirit proceeds as their Bond of Love. 
Ruusbroec calls this (the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit) the 
‘out-going’ aspect of the Trinity. He then makes an original move: he claims that the 
Holy Spirit, as the Bond of Love of Father and Son, is the principle of the return of the 
divine Persons into their shared perichoretic unity  – this is the ‘in-going’ dimension of 
the Trinity – where the divine Persons then find ‘rest’ – this is the moment of fruition or 
rest. From here the process starts all over again, in its threefold dynamic (‘going -out’; 
‘going-in’; ‘fruition’), allowing him to describe the Trinity in highly dynamic terms as ‘an 
ebbing, flowing sea’ (Van Nieuwenhove 2003a). 
The real significance of this original Trinitarian theology is the way it shapes the life of 
the Christian: the Christian is called to share in the ‘out-going’ dimension (a life of 
charity, engaging actively with the external world); in the ‘in-going’ aspect (a life of 
devotion and interiority); and in a life of contemplation and fruition of God (in the 
Augustinian sense of ‘enjoying God’, namely God as the ultimate concern in life). The 
contemplative life, however, is not the highest for Ruusbroec. As indicated, his ideal is 
the common life, which combines all three dimensions in a harmonious synthesis 
(charitable activity, interiority, contemplation).  
If Ruusbroec’s ideal is deeply Trinitarian, it is no less Christocentric for that. For Christ 
is, of course, ‘the common person’, the one who is without cease contemplating and 
active: 
Christ is, in accordance with his humanity, the greatest contemplative that ever 
was, for he was one with Wisdom, and he himself was the Wisdom with which 
we contemplate. Yet he was also actively meeting the needs of people in his 
works of charity, while contemplating the countenance of the Father without 
cease. And this is the nobility of this gift: to be active and contemplative, and 
remain unhindered , as much as one can. (Realm, 2158-64) 
The ‘nobility of this gift’ refers to the gift of understanding (Latin: intellectus), one of the 
gifts of the Holy Spirit. Ruusbroec further relates it to the beatitude of the pure of heart, 
who will see God – for these people have become so like Christ, the Wisdom and Image 
of God, that they do not become distracted (onverbeeldet) by earthly temptations. 
From this brief outline it will have become clear that Ruusbroec adopts the 
exemplarism of the Augustinian-Bonaventurean tradition but he develops it in a more 
theological-anthropological manner. While acknowledging that the sacramentality and 
intelligibility of the world is due to its ideal existence as divine exemplars (Realm, 2076-
2103), he pays particular attention to how the soul is attuned to union with the Image of 
God, the second Person of the Trinity. He ends his book by describing how the Christian 
becomes transformed (ghetransformeert)   
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by the eternal Image, the Wisdom of the Father, who is an Image and Exemplar of 
all creatures. In this Image all material and spiritual things have their life. 
Through this Image all creatures flow into their created being, and receive a 
likeness to God. (…) But the noble, common person is most alike [to God], for he 
flows out with virtues, and in this he resembles God, who flows out with his gifts; 
and he remains in eternal enjoyment, and there he is one with God beyond all  
gifts. This is an enlightened common person in a most noble fashion. (Realm, 
2749-56) 
Thus, Ruusbroec is one of the last heirs to a Christian-Neoplatonist tradition in which 
exemplarism grounds the sacramentality and intelligibility of creation, and mould s the 
human person in such a way as to be naturally attuned to becoming transformed in 
Christ, the Image and Exemplar of God, through whom we come to participate in the 
intra-Trinitarian dynamics of activity and fruition.  
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